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Abstract
We study the role of status in an experimental Principal-Agent game.
Status is awarded to subjects based on either talent or luck. In each
randomly matched principal-agent pair, the principal chooses the agents
status-contingent piece rate for a task in which talent matters for perfor-
mance (an IQ test). We perform the experiment in Cambridge (UK) and
in HCMV (Vietnam). We nd that in Cambridge piece rate o¤ers are sig-
nicantly higher for high-status agents (only) when status signals talent.
However, these higher o¤ers are not payo¤-maximizing for the principals.
In contrast, Vietnam piece rate o¤ers are signicantly higher for high-status
agents (only) when status is determined by luck. We explore possible ex-
planations, and the implications for status and incentives.
Keywords: incentives, status, identity, piece rate, principal-agent, sig-
naling, culture.
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1. Introduction
A large literature, theoretical and empirical, highlights the importance of status
concerns: individuals generally care about their standing in society, and strive
to achieve social recognition and esteem. They also behave di¤erently towards
people they perceive as having more or less status. Indeed, one reason why people
care so much about social status is that higher status can result in more favor-
able treatment by others1. For example, in trust game experiments Glaeser et
al. (2000) nd that high-status rst movers tend to receive back more, and earn
more, while Falk and Zehnder (2013) nd that high-status second movers tend to
be trusted more, and be sent more. Ball et al. (2001) allocate status randomly
to participants in market game ("box design") experiments: they nd that higher
status subjects earn more when the status allocation is observed by all partici-
pants, and less when status is allocated privately. They conclude that "deference
by the low-status group is at least as important as condence on the part of the
higher-status group".
These two examples suggest quite di¤erent underlying mechanisms for the
e¤ect of status on behavior. The ndings by Glaeser et al. (2000) and Falk and
Zehnder (2013) are consistent with a signaling mechanism: an individuals status
can signal personal characteristics that are relevant to other individualsoptimal
strategy when interacting with him/her. For example, if high status signals greater
trustworthiness, high-status individuals will tend to be trusted more. If high status
signals a greater ability to punish unfavorable treatment, high-status individuals
will tend to be treated more favorably. The results obtained by Ball et al. (2001),
on the other hand, are hard to reconcile with such a signaling explanation, since
status is allocated randomly. One possibility is that, once a role has been allocated
to them very explicitly by the experimenters, subjects to some extent identify with
that role, expect others to do the same, and behave accordingly. Thus if subjects
perceive high status as being associated with greater condence, we should not be
surprised to nd, in the words of Ball et al. (2001), that "the higher-status side of
the market appears to be marginally more "stubborn" than the lower-status side,
and lower-status players are marginally more willing to defer to the higher-status
players". Such an identication mechanism would imply a direct e¤ect of status
on behavior, quite distinct from the role of status as simply conveying information
about an individuals (exogenous) characteristics.
Understanding the signicance of any direct e¤ect of status on behavior is
1See, for example, the discussions in Weiss and Fershtman (1998), He¤etz and Frank (2011).
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important for the design of incentives. To this end, we designed an experiment in
which the nature of the game to be played is held constant, but we vary the extent
to which status can signal personal characteristics, and the status allocation rule
is made transparently clear to participants. The game itself is a Principal-Agent
game, so as to capture some key features of many everyday social and economic
interactions. Participants are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs, and
assigned either the role of Principal or the role of Agent. Complete anonymity
(relative to the experimenters as well) is used to reduce concerns over potential
"experimenter demand" e¤ects, and to isolate the e¤ects of our status allocation.
Each Agent completes a task, consisting of an IQ test with 12 questions. The
game works as follows: the Agents Principal receives an amount y for each correct
answer given by the Agent. Before the test, the Principal chooses the amount x
that he will pay the Agent for each correct answer, and this is communicated to
the Agent.
The key step for studying the e¤ects of status occurred before our experimen-
tal subjects learned about the Principal Agent game. Student volunteers for an
experiment on decision-making were told they had to rst complete a question-
naire in order to participate in the experiment. This questionnaire contained 21
questions, including questions about age, gender, own education and parentsed-
ucation. It also contained a question taken from an IQ test (di¤erent from the IQ
test used as the Agents task), and a question asking the respondent to guess the
experiment directors favorite color out of 11 possible choices. We refer to these as
the "intelligence" question and the "color" question in what follows. All our par-
ticipants answered these questions; they were then randomly allocated to either
the "intelligence" condition or the "color" condition. In the intelligence condition,
they were reminded of the intelligence question in the questionnaire, and told that
participants who had given the correct answer would receive a gold-coloured rib-
bon at the end of the experiment. Principals were then asked to choose their
Agents piece rate x. They had to specify two piece rates, contingent on whether
the Agent would be receiving a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment. The
relevant amount was communicated to the Agent (without feedback on whether
they had given the correct answer in the questionnaire). The same applied in
the color condition, using the color question in this case, with one di¤erence: the
"right" answer was revealed to participants before Agents took the test. Thus
Agents knew when performing the task whether they would receive a gold ribbon
at the end or not. In each condition, the exact procedure was common knowledge
to all participants.
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The gold ribbon is analogous to the gold star used in Ball et al. (2001) as a
symbol of status. Our color condition can be viewed as analogous to their random
condition in one respect: status is essentially allocated randomly, since guessing
the "right" color is a matter of luck2, and this is made clear to participants.3
However, our manipulation is much weaker than theirs since there is no cere-
mony (we maintain complete anonymity), and no di¤erential treatment by the
experimenters of subjects who are given gold ribbons. We can therefore investi-
gate whether the random allocation of symbolic awards is su¢ cient to generate
a signicant di¤erence in treatment by the participants (even in the absence of
a ceremony and strong clues by the experimenter that award recipients should
receive favorable treatment). Our intelligence condition di¤ers from Ball et al.
(2001), since receipt of a gold ribbon is informative about the individuals talent.
As we show in section 3, there is no presumption that this should lead to dif-
ferent piece rates being o¤ered to agents in a standard Principal-Agent setting,
absent status considerations. Comparing results for the two conditions enables us
to study whether there are any direct e¤ects of status on behavior, and how such
e¤ects di¤er depending on whether status is based on talent or luck.
In a nutshell, the signaling hypothesis in this context predicts no di¤erence
in the piece rates o¤ered to agents with and without gold ribbons. The identi-
cation hypothesis, on the other hand, requires a denition of status, and of the
expectations associated with it. We follow Ball et al. (2001), who dene status
as a "ranking in a hierarchy that is socially recognized and typically carries with
it the expectation of entitlement to certain resources". In our setting, this can
plausibly be translated into an expectation of higher piece rates for agents with
higher status.
Our experiment was conducted in two very di¤erent locations, England and
Vietnam, with student participants from the University of Cambridge and the
Vietnam National University in Saigon. It is sometimes claimed that concern over
status is particularly strong in Asian countries4, and recent work by Huberman,
Loch and ½Onç½uler (2004) found stronger reactions to status in Hong Kong than in
Europe or the United States. We therefore expected our results to show a more
2The experiment director took care not to signal any color preference through her choice of
clothing or in any other way.
3Ball et al. (2001) also have an "awarded" status condition. This too is essentially random,
but this is not made clear to participants, who are simply not told the status allocation rule. In
our experiment participants are told exactly how gold ribbons are allocated, in both conditions.
4See, for example, Ball and Eckel (1996) and the references therein.
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important role for status in Saigon than in Cambridge.
We did nd striking di¤erences between the two locations. In Cambridge,
subjects assigned to the role of principal in the color condition did not o¤er sig-
nicantly di¤erent piece rates to high-status versus low-status agents (the mean
o¤er was lower for high-status agents, while the di¤erence was not statistically
signicant). In the intelligence condition, on the other hand, principals o¤ered
signicantly higher piece rates to high-status agents. This pattern was completely
reversed in Vietnam: principals in the intelligence condition did not o¤er signi-
cantly di¤erent piece rates to agents, contingent on their status, but principals in
the color condition o¤ered signicantly higher piece rates to high-status agents.
These results suggest that status does have a direct e¤ect on behavior. More-
over, what confers status appears to depend on (local) social and cultural norms:
among Cambridge University students, talent confers status, while luck does not.
Among students of the Vietnam National University, we nd the opposite pattern.
These results were, to us, surprising. We were able to discount experimenter
demand e¤ects as the explanation, partly because we had been very careful to min-
imize these through our design, but also, most importantly, because they cannot
account for the di¤erent patterns observed across treatments and locations. We
then checked whether performance on the IQ test was increased more by o¤ering
a higher piece rate to higher-status agents than to lower-status agents. In other
words, were principals maximizing their expected payo¤? This check was only
possible for the intelligence condition, since in the color condition very few partici-
pants guessed the right color. We found quite the opposite: in the Cambridge sam-
ple, increasing the piece rate only increased performance for lower-status agents,
while in the Vietnam sample, the piece rate had no e¤ect on performance. Thus
o¤ering higher piece rates to higher-status agents did not maximize the princi-
pals expected payo¤. We discuss in section 4 why we believe the identication
hypothesis o¤ers a plausible interpretation of our ndings.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section discusses the
related literature. Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedures, as
well as the two samples. Section 3 outlines a simple Principal-Agent model as a
benchmark without status e¤ects, yielding predictions concerning the principals
choice of piece rate, and the agents e¤ort and performance as functions of the
piece rate. Section 4 presents and discusses our experimental results. Section 5
concludes.
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1.1. Relationship to the literature
Our work is clearly related to the growing literature on the economics of status5.
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) study the impact of symbolic awards on perfor-
mance in a eld experiment. Students were hired to work on a project for a xed
wage. In the award treatment, they were promised an award (a congratulatory
card) for the best performance. Average performance increased by about 12%
with the award. Our study also explores the impact of symbolic awards (the gold
ribbons). However, we are mainly interested in distinguishing between awards that
reward talent and awards that reward luck, and their implications for subsequent
interactions between principals and agents. Thus our approach is complementary
to the one by Kosfeld and Neckermann: we show that one reason for individuals
to be motivated by symbolic awards is the e¤ect these may have on subsequent
interactions. Indeed, it is quite common for people to "display" symbolic awards
they have received in the past (e.g. prizes are often listed in a persons curriculum
vitae, or exhibited in o¢ ces or living rooms, depending on the nature of the prize).
Ball et al. (2001) allocate status randomly to individuals in the lab, and then
conduct market ("box design") experiments in which the sellers or the buyers
are the high-status group. As discussed earlier, one of their key ndings is that
the high-status group earns more when the allocation of status is observed by all
participants. We nd a similar e¤ect for our Vietnam sample, even though the
setting is very di¤erent, involving a Principal-Agent game rather than a market
game. However, we do not nd this e¤ect for our Cambridge sample: when status
is essentially allocated randomly (on the basis of the color question), there is no
signicant di¤erence in piece rates for the high-status group and the low-status
group (and the average is lower for the high-status group). Thus our Cambridge
participants do not appear to view the symbolic award of a gold ribbon (analogous
to the gold star in Ball et al. (2001)) as conferring status when the allocation of
awards is based on luck. They do, on the other hand, when the allocation of
awards is based on intelligence.
Our paper is also related to a number of other experimental studies that allo-
cate status in the lab, either exogenously or endogenously, and explore the e¤ects
on behavior. Several papers allocate status on the basis of answers to a trivia
5For some reviews and discussions, see Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), Frey (2007), Hef-
fetz and Frank (2011), Postlewaite (1998), Weiss and Fershtman (1998). Recent theoretical
contributions exploring the implications of preferences for social status include Auriol and Re-
nault (2008), Besley and Ghatak (2008), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006), Ederer and Patacconi
(2010), Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007).
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quiz, and then examine the impact on behavior in di¤erent settings: Ball and
Eckel (1996, 1998) study ultimatum games; Eckel, Fatas and Wilson (2010) public
good contribution games played in "star" networks; Eckel and Wilson (2007) coor-
dination games; Kumru and Vesterlund (2008) sequential voluntary-contribution
games. Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2010) investigate instead how feedback
about relative performance a¤ects behavior.
Our distinction between awards based on talent and those based on luck relates
our work to Vostroknutov, Tobler and Rustichini (2012). They induce experimen-
tal subjects to play a sequence of trials in either skill or luck games. Subjects
receive feedback on their performance and the performance of others at the end
of each trial, and then have an opportunity to reduce the payo¤s of others. A
key nding is that, everything else being equal, the probability that subjects re-
duce the payment of others is higher in the luck game. Although the setting is
completely di¤erent, we nd a related result for our Cambridge sample, where
subjects are treated more favorably when their status is due to good performance
in a skill task than a luck task.
Our identication hypothesis is clearly related to the notion of identity devel-
oped by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In their work, identity is associated with
social categories and how individuals in these categories should behave: depar-
ture from these prescriptions causes anxiety and discomfort for the individuals
concerned and for those interacting with them. We study how social categories
generated in the lab, based on status, a¤ect behavior.
Finally, we are only aware of one other experimental paper studying the impact
of status which carries out the same experiment in countries with quite di¤erent
cultural norms. Huberman, Loch and Önçüler (2004) perform their experiment
in ve countries: Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United States.
The experiment has two stages: subjects choose how much to invest in the rst
stage; a winner is then picked; the winner can go on to participate in a lottery
in the second stage. Higher investment increases the probability of becoming
the winner in the rst stage, but reduces the expected payo¤ from participation
in the lottery. The "status" manipulation in the treatment condition involves
a public announcement of the rst-stage winner, who is given a "Winner" tag,
and applauded by the other participants. The authors nd that investments
are signicantly higher in the status condition for the samples from Hong Kong,
Turkey and the United States. Moreover, comparing these three countries, the
impact of status is highest in Hong Kong and lowest in the United States.
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2. Description of the experiment
This was a pen and paper experiment, with the following structure.
2.1. Questionnaire
In order to participate in the experiment, subjects rst complete a questionnaire
(see Appendix B) with a number of questions, including questions about age,
gender, eld of study, and parentseducation. The last two questions are given
below: one is taken from an IQ test (Q1), and the other is designed so that giving
the right answer is a matter of luck (Q2).
(Q1) Four years ago, John was twice as old as James. In four years time,
Jamesage will be 75% of Johns age. How old is John now?
(Q2) Which color do you believe to be the experiment directors favorite color,
out of the following? Red, yellow, black, gold, green, white, pink, blue, brown,
grey, orange.
2.2. Experiment
In the experiment, subjects are randomly allocated to the "intelligence" treatment
or the "color" treatment. In each treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to
role "A" (Principal) or role "B" (Agent) and matched randomly and anonymously
in A-B pairs6. The timing of the game is presented in Figure 1.
A chooses (x)
amount he will
give B for each
correct answer
B learns how much she/he
will be paid (x) by correct
answer
B answers 12
questions of Raven
Test
Questions are graded: for
each correct answer, B
gets x and A gets (y-x).
Figure 1: Timing of the game
Subjects learn that the Agent will be given an IQ test consisting of 12 questions
(taken from Ravens Advanced Matrices Test7). They also learn that the Principal
6The words "Principal" and "Agent" are never used in the instructions, just "A" and "B".
7Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices is an IQ test in which gures sharing a logical
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will receive a payment of value y (see below) for each correct answer given by the
Agent, and that the Principal has to decide the amount x to pay the Agent for
each correct answer. All participants are told that those who answered correctly
Q1 or Q2 (depending on treatment) will receive a gold-colored ribbon at the end
of the experiment. In the color treatment, they also learn the "correct" answer to
Q2. The Principal then chooses the Agents piece rate x contingent on whether
the Agent is going to obtain a gold ribbon or not (using the strategy method8).
Agents learn their piece rate and take the test. The procedures just described
are common knowledge to Principal and Agent (full details of the experimental
instructions are given in Appendix A). Meanwhile, principals are asked to guess
agentsperformance (again, using the strategy method). After the test, agents
guess their own performance. Earnings are revealed privately at the end.
The experiment is performed in two di¤erent locations: University of Cam-
bridge and Vietnam National University - Pôle Universitaire Français (Ho Chi
Minh City). In both cases, experimental subjects are student volunteers. They
receive a £ 3 - 30000 VDN (Viet Nam Dong) participation fee, and £ 1 - 10000
VDN to be shared for each correct test answer. Given that all participants are
university students, equivalence has been calculated in terms of the price of a
lunch at the university cafeteria.
2.3. The samples
Table 1 presents the statistics for both samples.
For the Cambridge sample, we have 112 students from the University of Cam-
bridge (56 principal-agent pairs), both undergraduates and graduates. They study
a wide variety of subjects: 33.9% Economics and Business, 37.5% Sciences, Maths,
Medicine and Engineering; 27.68% Humanities. Approximately 39% are UK stu-
dents, and the remainder come from all over the world.
From VietNam University in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) we have 95 students.
They are all students at the Pôle Universitaire Français (PUF), rst and sec-
ond year Economics undergraduate students. Approximately 50% of the students
come from HCMV, the remainder from neighboring regions (Mekong Delta, Nha
Trang, Da Lat). The Pôle Universitaire Français is a cooperation program be-
tween the Vietnam National University and di¤erent universities in France, and
pattern are presented, with one missing; the task is to choose the missing gure in a set of
feasible options.
8For evidence as well as discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the strategy
method, see Brandts and Charness (2011).
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Table 1: Vietnam and Cambridge samples
Vietnam Cambridge
All Intelligence Color All Intelligence Color
Number of pairs 47 24 23 56 26 30
Age 19,24 19,02 19,45 23.34*1 22,82 23,8
Female 58% 57% 60% 57% 51% 61%
Moved (in country) 61% 51% 71%*2 97%*1 94% 100%*2
Moved (between countries) 4% 2% 6% 66%*1 75% 60%*2
Father's Education 2,96 3 2,93 2,96 2,86 3,05
Mother's Education 2,79 2,86 2,71 2,81 2,82 2,81
1 = primary school
2 = secondary education
3 = university
4 = technical education
*1 Difference between Vietnam and Cambridge samples, significant 5%
*2 Difference between Intelligence and Color samples, significant 10%
for economics in Ho Chi Minh City the agreement is with Université de Toulouse
1. Courses in the program are taught by faculty of the Université de Toulouse
1, and the experiment director had been part of the program for two years at
the time of the experiment. Students belong to both branches of the program,
Anglophone and Francophone, and the experiment was performed in English and
French respectively for each of the groups.
Students from both locations completed the same questionnaire. To know
more about the environment in which the students grew up, we asked them about
their birthplace and other places where they had lived. For the Cambridge sample,
we nd that an important share of participants are born outside the UK, while in
the Vietnam sample mobility is mainly between cities.
3. Benchmark Model
This section outlines our benchmark Principal-Agent model and obtains its pre-
dictions concerning the principals choice of piece rate, as well as the agents
e¤ort and performance as functions of the piece rate. The principal is awarded
one unit of income for each correct answer given by the agent. The agent decides
how much e¤ort to exert in answering each question, knowing the piece rate per
correct answer.
Let N be the number of questions in the agents test, and w the piece rate per
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correct answer. Denote by e the agents e¤ort on each question, by  the agents
talent/ability, and by p(e; ) the probability of answering correctly. The agents
expected utility is then given by
Ua(; w) = N [wp(e; )  c(e)]
where c(e) represents the cost of e¤ort. The Agents problem is given by:
max
e
N [wp(e; )  c(e)]
and the rst order condition is
c0(e) = w
@p(e; )
@e
If we assume that p(e; ) = e, implying that e¤ort and ability are comple-
ments, and that c(e) = e
2
2
, we obtain
e =
w

Thus e¤ort and performance should both increase with the piece rate and with
ability.
The principals expected utility is given by
Up(e; ) = (1  w)Np(e; )
= (1  w)N 
2w

The principals problem is
max
w
Up = (1  w)wN
2

from which it is easy to see that he will never choose a corner solution (w = 0
or w = 1). The rst order condition yields the interior solution
w =
1
2
The model gives two sharp predictions: (1) the piece rate does not depend on
ability or luck, and (2) both e¤ort and performance increase with the piece rate.
These predictions will be our starting point in the next section, where we analyze
participantsbehavior in the experiment.
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Table 2: Answers to the 'intelligence' and 'color' questions
Vietnam Cambridge
All Intelligence Color All Intelligence Color
Number of pairs 47 24 23 56 26 30
Correct answer 36,84% 5,26% 44,64% 6,25%
4. Experimental Results
We begin by describing the data. Table 2 summarizes the questionnaire responses
to the "intelligence" question and the "color" question: we see that a substantial
proportion of participants in both locations gave the correct answer to the intel-
ligence question, while very few individuals managed to guess the correct color.
Figures 2 and 3 show the piece rate o¤ers for "ribbon" and "no ribbon" agents,
conditional on treatment and location, while Figures 4 and 5 depict agent per-
formance (test score) as a function of the piece rate.We note that in Vietnam no
agent scored less than 7 correct answers out of 12 on the test, irrespective of the
piece rate. In Cambridge there were three subjects who scored exactly zero on
the test, while the remainder all scored at least 9 (and the majority scored 12
correct answers). We believe the three zero test scores were a deliberate reaction
to relatively low piece rate o¤ers9. As such, we do not view them as "outliers"
to be excluded in the standard sense. However, we perform robustness checks for
our regression results below, to see what happens when we remove these three
observations.
9Indeed, one of the three subjects had duly answered the test questions, and then deliberately
crossed them out so as to achieve a zero score.
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4.1. Piece rates and performance: does the data match the standard
model predictions?
We now investigate whether behavior in the experiment matched the predictions
of the Principal-Agent model of section 3. Table 3 summarizes these and our main
ndings.
Standard model Vietnam results Cambridge results
Piece rate
Independent of luck
or ability
Increases with
luck
Increases with
ability
Performance
Increases with
piece rate
Piece rate effect
(negative)
insignificant
Increases with
piece rate (full
sample)
Table 3
We obtained two main predictions from the model.
Prediction 1 : the piece rate does not depend on ability or luck.
Figure 6 shows the average piece rate in the intelligence treatment for "ribbon"
(agents who gave the correct answer to the "intelligence" question) and "no rib-
bon" (agents who did not give the correct answer). The light grey and dark grey
bars on the left of the graph show that there is no signicant di¤erence between
the piece rates in Vietnam (p = 0:706)10. This is consistent with Prediction 1. In
Cambridge, however, the piece rate is signicantly higher for more talented agents
(p = 0:004), as shown by the light and dark bars on the right of the graph.
10We report p-values for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, since for each Principal
we have the piece rate o¤er for "ribbon" and the one for "no ribbon".
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The piece rates for the color treatment are shown in Figure 7, again contrasting
"ribbon" (agents who gave the correct answer to the "color" question) and "no
ribbon" (agents who did not give the correct answer). Compared to the intelligence
treatment, the pattern is reversed: in Vietnam the piece rate is signicantly higher
for "ribbon" agents (p = 0:050). In Cambridge the average piece rate is lower for
"ribbon" agents, the di¤erence being just insignicant (p = 0:063). These results
are clearly inconsistent with Prediction 1.
Prediction 2: e¤ort and performance increase with the piece rate.
We do not observe e¤ort, but we do have a measure of performance, namely
the test score (number of correct answers). Table 4 presents the results from Tobit
regressions with the test score as the dependent variable.11
11In the Tobit regressions we allow for censoring at zero and twelve since the task consisted
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Table 4: Number of Correct Answers (tobit)
Cambridge Cambridge Vietnam
(full sample) (correct answers >0)
Piece rate 0,369 0,05381 -0,00002
(0.121)** (0,03998). (0.0001).
Talent 19,531 1,9646 0,8653
(8,113)** (2,5755). (1,2185).
Piece rate * Talent -0,40564 -0,03357 -0,000006
(0.1764)** (0,05676). (0.0002).
Male -3,689 -0,05383 0,92135
(2,271). (0,85413). (0,59281).
Age -0,1227 -0,0809 0,05595
(0,223). (0,0690). (0,2002).
Father's education 2,5985 0,8689 -0,7487
(1,908). (0,6445). (0,4773).
Mother's education 0,7048 0,4991 0,08182
(1,9199). (0,6218). (0,6109).
Economics -0,1488 -0,4315
(2,767). (0,8702).
Constant -4,708 8,912 11,757
(13,311). (4,0927). (3,9609).
N. observations 56 53 44
Pseudo R2 0,2093 0,1322 0,0488
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The explanatory variables include the piece rate, a "talent" dummy taking
value one if the agent answered correctly the intelligence question prior to the
experiment (Q1 in the questionnaire), and a term interacting these two variables.
The rst column reports the results for the full Cambridge sample. As expected,
the estimated coe¢ cients for the piece rate and for talent are positive and signi-
cant. The negative and signicant coe¢ cient for the interaction term implies that
the positive impact of the piece rate on performance is due to its e¤ect on the less
talented agents. We go on to remove the three observations with zero test scores,
and estimate the regression again. The results are reported in column 2. The es-
timated coe¢ cients for these variables have the same sign as in column 1, but are
no longer statistically signicant. We check the three removed observations, and,
as expected, nd that all three were "no ribbon" agents (they had not answered
correctly the intelligence question, Q1, in the questionnaire).
Thus the sensitivity of performance to the piece rate in the full Cambridge
sample was driven mainly by the few observations where the agent, faced with
a relatively low piece rate o¤er, chose to perform very poorly, giving no correct
answers. These results suggest that for most participants, the motivation provided
by the task (e.g. an IQ test can be interesting and challenging, and individuals
typically like to prove their intelligence) was far more important than the piece
rate. However for a few participants the o¤er of a relatively low piece rate was
su¢ cient to destroy any motivation to do well on the task.
We do not nd any of the Vietnam participants choosing to perform very
poorly. The results for the full Vietnam sample are reported in column 3. The
piece rate has a negative and insignicant impact on performance. The other
estimated coe¢ cients are also insignicant. A possible interpretation is that here
too, the motivation provided by the nature of the task was far more important
than the piece rate12.
4.2. Understanding the results
Some of our ndings are di¢ cult to reconcile with the Principal-Agent model
presented in section 3:
of 12 questions from a Raven test.
12Our results are consistent with those found by Dessí and Rustichini (2011) for a sample of
students from the University of Toulouse. In the rst of two experiments reported in the paper,
they gave an IQ test to participants in di¤erent conditions. They found that varying the piece
rate had virtually no impact on performance (test score).
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(1) Why do principals in Cambridge o¤er higher piece rates to agents who are
awarded gold ribbons for talent?
We conjectured that the model in section 3 might not adequately capture the
technology of the problem facing participants in the experiment (production func-
tion, cost of e¤ort). Could it be that in reality principals were maximizing their
expected payo¤ by giving higher piece rates to more talented agents? This would
be the case if the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term between talent and
the piece rate in Table 4 were positive, implying that a higher piece rate leads to
a bigger increase in performance for more talented agents than for less talented
agents. We nd the opposite: the coe¢ cient is negative13. It is of course possible
that Principals who o¤ered higher piece rates to "ribbon" agents nevertheless be-
lieved that higher piece rates would elicit a bigger increase in performance from
"ribbon" agents than from "no ribbon" agents. But this belief was incorrect.
(2) Why do principals in Vietnam o¤er higher piece rates to agents who are
awarded gold ribbons for luck?
Whatever assumptions are made about the technology of the problem, the
standard Principal-Agent model cannot account for this result. Whether a sub-
ject happened to guess correctly the experiment directors favorite color is simply
irrelevant. Could it be that Vietnam participants somehow interpreted guess-
ing the right color as a signal of talent/skill? We do not think this is plausible.
Moreover, answering correctly the "intelligence" question clearly did signal tal-
ent/skill relevant to the task, much more persuasively. Yet Vietnam participants
did not o¤er signicantly higher piece rates to "ribbon" agents in the intelligence
13It is interesting to compare our results with those obtained by Dessí and Rustichini (2011).
Following a rst experiment in which participants took an IQ test under di¤erent conditions
regarding pay, they conducted a second experiment, in which participants played a Principal-
Agent game very similar to the one in this paper, with a di¤erent IQ test. A key di¤erence
is that Agents in their second experiment knew their score on the rst IQ test, and Principals
made their piece rate o¤ers contingent on that score. Dessí and Rustichini found that Principals
o¤ered better piece rates to more talented agents, as in our Cambridge sample. This was payo¤-
maximizing for their Principals: the interaction term between talent and the piece rate was
positive. We conjecture that the di¤erence between our results and theirs is due to the di¤erent
information available to participants. In their experiment, agents with a high score on the rst
test had already demonstrated their talent (to themselves and to their peers): their intrinsic
motivation was therefore lower on the second test, and a su¢ ciently high piece rate was needed
to motivate them. Those with a low score in the rst test, on the other hand, may have been
highly motivated to prove the rst result could be dismissed as an inaccurate signal of their
ability. In our experiment, in contrast, agents took the IQ test having had no feedback on
whether they had answered correctly the intelligence question.
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treatment.
4.3. The identication hypothesis
The identication hypothesis o¤ers a possible interpretation of our ndings. If
higher status is perceived as implying entitlement to more resources and more fa-
vorable treatment, Principals may be willing to o¤er higher piece rates to agents
perceived as having higher status. This begs the question: why would talent (and
not luck) confer status in Cambridge, and luck (and not talent) in Saigon? It is not
hard to see why talent, and not luck, would tend to elicit social recognition and
esteem, particularly among students in a prestigious university with demanding
entry requirements based on talent. It is more di¢ cult, at rst sight, to under-
stand the result for Vietnam, given the high importance attached to learning and
education in Vietnamese culture. Indeed, teaching faculty in universities have
high social status in Vietnam. The experiment director, as member of the teach-
ing faculty in both Toulouse and Saigon, was struck by the respect and admiration
demonstrated by Vietnamese students (in comparison with French students back
in Toulouse). It may be that, precisely for this reason, guessing correctly the
experiment directors favorite color was interpreted not simply as luck, but rather
as a signal of familiarity with, and/or attentiveness to, a person of high social
status - and this in itself was perceived as conferring status.
5. Conclusions
The results we have just discussed strongly suggest that status has a direct e¤ect
on behavior in Principal-Agent interactions: status does more than simply convey
information about exogenous personal characteristics relevant to the task. In this
respect, our ndings support those by Ball et al. (2001) and extend them to a very
di¤erent context. However, we also show that the impact of status on behavior
is very sensitive to local social and cultural norms. When status is generated
in the lab, these norms a¤ect participantsperceptions and expectations: in a
sense, they complete the description of the game to be played. In the absence
of very strong, explicit clues by the experimenters showing who is to be treated
with special consideration and admiration, local norms will largely determine the
real allocation of status, as opposed to the purely symbolic allocation (through
symbolic awards). Outside the lab, local norms will be crucial in determining the
role of status. Understanding the interaction between status, norms and behavior,
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and the implications for the optimal design of incentives, seems to us an important
challenge for future work, in theory, in the lab and in the eld.
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7. Appendix A
7.1. Experimental Instructions
Here we present the experimental instructions for Principals and Agents in Cam-
bridge and in Vietnam. In both locations, the experiment was pen-and-paper
in university rooms. In Vietnam the instructions were translated into french for
the francophone students. We present the instructions as they were read in the
experiment, inserting the parts where Principal and Agent were taking decisions.
*****************
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Welcome; you are going to participate in an economics experiment. Your
answers and decisions will have no consequences whatever for your course grades
or your degree.
This experiment studies decision-making. There are no right or wrong deci-
sions you should simply decide according to your preferences.
The experiment will be remunerated. You will receive the remuneration to-
morrow morning. I will call in each participant individually to give him or her
the amount earned. The amount you receive will depend on your decisions and
on the decisions taken by the other participants. I will explain the rules of the
experiment in a moment.
Please now switch o¤ your mobile phones, and do not talk to each other
during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand and I will come
and answer.
Are there any questions?
If there are no questions, we can start. You will see some instructions on each
page. Read them carefully. Whenever you are asked a question, take the time
you need to answer. If you want to ask a question during the experiment, please
raise your hand.
                               
General rules
During this experiment you will be asked at times to take decisions that will
a¤ect your outcome and the outcome for other participants. It is important for
you to know that your decisions will remain completely condential.
Each person will belong to a group of two participants, depending on the
number you picked at the beginning. You will never know who was the other
member of your group and they will never know that you were the other member
of their group.
Within each group of two, there will be a participant Aand a participant
B. Each person will learn his or her role (A or B) in a moment. When we refer
to the other member of your group, we will always use the letter (A or B) and
never the number or any other information that might allow you to identify him
or her.
If you have a question, please raise your hand.
If there are no questions, we can move on to the specic instructions.
                                
Specic instructions
In the experiment, we will give to each participant « B » a set of questions
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from a Raven test, which is often used to measure intelligence quotient (IQ).
In particular, in each group of two participants, Bwill answer 12 questions
(the same questions for all participants B). Awill receive one pound for each
correct answer given by B.
Before starting the test, Awill have to choose the amount he will pay B
for each correct answer given by B. The chosen amount will be disclosed to B
before starting the test.
After the end of the experiment, when payments are made, B will be told
the number of correct answers he gave, and also the average number of correct
answers given by participants in the session.
                                
FOR PRINCIPALS:
You are the « A » participant in your group. We will shortly ask you to choose
the amount X that you will give to « B » for each correct answer.
You will therefore receive one pound minus X for each correct answer given by
B.
You will be asked to make your choice under two possible hypotheses concern-
ing B; we will use the choice that corresponds to the correct hypothesis.
Reminder: this choice will be disclosed to Bbefore starting the test.
FOR AGENTS:
You are the participant « B » in your group. You are going to answer 12
questions from a Raven test, which is often used to measure intelligence quotient
(IQ).
You will receive an amount X for each correct answer you give. Participant
A in your group will receive one pound minus X for each correct answer you
give.
Participant Ain your group will choose the amount X for each of two possible
assumptions about you. We will then tell you his choice of X for the assumption
that applies to you.
First we show you the assumptions for which we are asking participant A
to choose X.
                                 -
Intelligence treatment:
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Important : all the participants in todays experiment have completed a ques-
tionnaire and sent it to us in order to be able to participate. In that questionnaire,
each participant answered the following question:
Question: Four years ago, Jean was twice as old as Jacques. In four years
time, Jacquesage will be 75% of Jeans age. How old is Jean now?
Some participants gave the correct answer to this question. These participants
will receive a gold-colour ribbon at the end of the experiment.
Colour treatment:
Important : all the participants in todays experiment have completed a ques-
tionnaire in order to be able to participate. In that questionnaire, each participant
answered the following question:
Question: which colour do you believe to be the experiment directors favourite
colour, out of the following? Red, yellow, black, gold, green, white, pink, blue,
brown, grey, orange.
Some participants chose the answer we were looking for, gold. These partici-
pants will receive a gold-colour ribbon at the end of the experiment.
                                 -
FOR PRINCIPALS:
Now we ask you to choose the amount X that you will pay to the participant
« B » in your group for each correct answer he gives. We ask you to state your
choice under two di¤erent assumptions concerning B.
Assumption 1: Bwill receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
Decision 1 : For each correct answer given by B, I will gain 1 pound and
will give _ _ _ pence to B.
Assumption 2: Bwill not receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
Decision 2: For each correct answer given by B, I will gain 1 pound and will
give _ _ _ _ pence to B.
                                
Now we will collect your answers. We will then tell B participants the choice
of X that applies to them. They will thus be able to start their test.
Participant « B » in your group is answering the 12 questions from Ravens
test. We ask you now to guess how many correct answers he or she will give. You
will earn an additional pound if your answer is correct. Please give your answer
for each of the two possible cases described below: we will use the one that applies
to participant B in your group to calculate your earnings.
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Remark: if you have forgotten, you can look at your previous answers to know
how much you have decided to pay B for each correct answer.
Assumption 1: Bwill receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
In your opinion, how many correct answers will B give?
In my opinion, B will give _ _ _ _ correct answers.
Assumption 2: Bwill not receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
In your opinion, how many correct answers will B give?
In my opinion, B will give _ _ _ _ correct answers.
Now the test is nished.
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. Please leave your answers
on the table before going out.
See you tomorrow!
                                 -
FOR AGENTS:
We ask participant « A » to choose the amount X he will pay participant «
B » for each correct answer given by B. We ask him for his choice of X in each
of the following two cases.
Assumption 1: Bwill receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
Assumption 2: Bwill not receive a gold ribbon at the end of the experiment.
                                 -
Participant « A » in your group has decided to give you _ _ _ pence for each
correct answer that you will give to the 12 questions in the test.
You will have 13 minutes and 12 seconds (on average 66 seconds per question)
to complete the test.
After the end of the experiment, when you come back to be paid, we will tell
you how many correct answers you gave, and what was the average number of
correct answers in your session.
                                 -
THE TEST
Now the test is nished.
Thank you for your participation in this experiment. Please leave your answers
on the table before going out.
See you tomorrow!
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8. Appendix B
8.1. Questionnaire
ID code:
Now we ask you to answer the following questions:
(1) What is your age ?
(2) You are 1 = a man or 2 = a woman
(3) What is your height (cm.) ?
(4) How many brothers do you have?
(5) How many sisters do you have ?
(6) If you have brothers and/or sisters, you are in terms of age 1=the rst,
2= the second,. . . ?
(7) Your place of birth : (a) the place, (b) the nearest town, (c) country
(8) The place where you have lived until the age of 18 (if more than one,
please for each place note the age when you started living there).
(9) Your fathers education (1 = primary school ; 2 = secondary education
; 3 = university; 4 = technical education)
(10) Your mothers education (1 = primary school ; 2 = secondary educa-
tion ; 3 = university; 4 = technical education)
(11) Which languages do you speak?
(12) What is your eld of studies?
(13) In which year of studies are you?
(14) Which are the three historic events that have marked your memory
the most? (1 = the most important ;. . . ) For each event, please indicate your
impression of it on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = very negative; 10 = very positive).
(15) Which are the three historical characters that have marked your mem-
ory the most? For each character, please indicate their most important quality or
defect, together with your global impression of each of them in a scale from 0 to
10 (0 = very negative; 10 = very positive)
(16) To what extent do you agree with the following statement : « In
general, most people can be trusted » (on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = do not
agree: 10 = totally agree)
(17) To what extent do you agree with the following statement : In general
I expect more positive than negative events in my life » (on a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 = do not agree: 10 = totally agree)
(18) In general fathers try to advise their children on the organization of
their lives. Can you indicate the importance that your father gave to the following
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advices (on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = little importance ; 10 = a lot of
importance) :
N1 Work regularly
N2 Keep your promises
N3 Be prudent
N4 Think before acting
N5 Do not trust people you do not know
N7 Be sincere
N8 Dont let people make a fool of you
N9 Be strong
N10 Be careful not to waste money and goods.
N11 Go after success
N12 Give a good example
N13 Do not take advantage of others
N14 Behave like others
(19) In general mothers try to advise their children on the organization
of their lives. Can you indicate the importance that your mother gave to the
following advices (on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = little importance ; 10 = a
lot of importance) :
N1 Work regularly
N2 Keep your promises
N3 Be prudent
N4 Think before acting
N5 Do not trust people you do not know
N7 Be sincere
N8 Dont let people make a fool of you
N9 Be strong
N10 Be careful not to waste money and goods.
N11 Go after success
N12 Give a good example
N13 Do not take advantage of others
N14 Behave like others
(20) which colour do you believe to be the experiment directors favourite
colour, out of the following? Red, yellow, black, gold, green, white, pink, blue,
brown, grey, orange.
(21) Four years ago, Jean was twice as old as Jacques. In four yearstime,
Jacquesage will be 75% of Jeans age. How old is Jean now?
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